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Abstract 
The inflow of migrants from Central Asia to Russian Federation and their accommodation are 
examined via a specific case of the Republic of Tatarstan with significant numbers of Tatar 
population historically adhered to Islam and often called ‘the Muslim Republic’ of Russia. 
Hypothesis on a greater loyalty and tolerance of ethnic Tatars towards migrant fellow believers, 
the role of common Turkic and religious identity of local residents and newcomers is explored on 
a basis of empirical sociological data. It is argued that there is a great similarity in the attitudes of 
the ‘Muslim’ (Tatar) and ‘Christian’ (Russian) population of the republic towards migrants; they 
are characterized by high degree of negativism and latent xenophobia. The numbers of Tatars with 
positive and inclusive opinions is small, yet multicultural Tatarstan with local Muslim believers 
and numerous mosques is taken by migrants from Central Asia as a rather comfortable place to 
work and stay. 
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Historical multinationality of present day Russia is accompanied by strengthening of its 
polyethnicity due to the intensification of migration inflow. In recent years not only the largest 
Russian cities – Moscow and St. Petersburg – became a place of attraction for migrants; geography 
of arrivals covers the entire territory of the country, both urban and rural areas. The structure of 
the external migration, defined by the objectives of arrival is very diverse, but the most of the 
public attention is attracted to voluntary labor migration that causes the strongest debates. The 
number of immigrants from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus - 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan prevails in it. This is mainly a new 
generation of young men who have grown up under the revival of Islam in the newly created 
independent post-Soviet states and do not have the Soviet experience that has the older generation 
in these countries. 
Accommodation and possible naturalization of migrants in Russian society is the subject 
of fierce debates. References to the public statements of European leaders about the "collapse of 
multiculturalism" are used to justify the policies of exclusion of "aliens." Foreign researchers note 
the changing nature of public rhetoric against Muslim immigrant groups after the events of 11 
September 2001 in the United States. The criticism of multiculturalism causes an orientation on 
the new integration policy, yet, it is stressed that it is still not clear whether it will become a 
supplement or an alternative to the strategies for maintaining of a cultural pluralism (Banting K., 
Kymlicka W., 2006; 2). The attention is attracted by the tendency of unification of goals, standards 
and convergence of the migration policy in the European Union, which replaces the national-
specific approaches to the reception and integration of migrants; the forefront is taken by anti-
discriminatory strategies, orientation on inclusive citizenship and parallel retreat from 
multicultural recognition (Joppke, 2007). In Europe Muslims are more and more often are labeled 
as "others", and "Muslim" in the public discourse is opposed to "European", Islam is associated 
with an unacceptable patriarchy, a religious intolerance and a tendency to support authoritarian 
regimes (Langenohl, 2014; 179). 
The criticism of multiculturalism in Russia, that is sensitive to the negative experience of 
adaptation of Muslim migrants in Europe, is particularly susceptible to allegations on the threats 
of terrorism and extremism emanating from Central Asia migrants, to the prevalence of non-
traditional for Russia radical Islamic movements undermining national security. In this context, 
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the practice of interaction with the newcomers in Tatarstan which is often referred to as a "Muslim 
republic" of Russia is of a particular interest. About half of the region’s population – vast majority 
of ethnic Tatars – identify themselves as Muslims, there are about 1 400 mosques and Islamic 
educational institutions, religious holidays are celebrated. 
2 STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS  
In Tatarstan the dominant population are ethnic Tatars [53% according to the All-Russia 
Population Census held in 2010]; across the country their quantity does not exceed 3.9% (All-
Russia Population Census held in 2010). Russians representing the majority in the country 
markedly yield in the Republic of Tatarstan to the number of Tatars, with no more than 40% of 
the population. The policy of strengthening of the territorial independence and autonomy (Derrick, 
2008), or as identified by other authors, of national sovereignty (Rorlich, 1999; Faller, 2002), 
contributed to the development of a distinctive ethno-national identity of the Tatars. It contributed 
to the growth of religious consciousness and rebirth Islam as the religion of their 
ancestors. Tatarstan is a multicultural republic, which is the territory of fusion of Slavic and Turkic 
cultures, of Christian and Muslim religions. Influx of migrants into the republic from neighboring 
countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus allows to evaluate the Turkic loyalty of the Tatar 
population and the degree of religious solidarity with correligionists. 
The empirical base of this study was the data of the mass survey of the population 
Republic of Tatarstan held in 2012 (1 590 respondents of 18 years of age and older), statistical 
materials and departmental documents (Federal Migration Service of Russia (hereinafter FMS), 
the Ministry of Health and Social Development), discourse analysis of Tatarstan's press for the 
period 2013 – 2014, interviews with migrants and employers. 
According to the Department of the FMS in Tatarstan, the greatest increase in immigrants 
coming from Uzbekistan (33%), Tajikistan (10%), Azerbayzhdan (6%), Kazakhstan (5%), 
Kyrgyzstan and other countries was observed. Citizens of Turkey dominated among migrant 
workers from the ‘far abroad’ foreign countries. As it was evidenced during the interviews with 
migrants, they consider themselves Muslims, try to observe religious precepts and customs, so 
Tatarstan with its numerous mosques and close in terms of faith population is an attractive and 
generally comfortable place to stay. 
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The mass survey in the Republic of Tatarstan showed that the positions of the Tatars and 
Russians in the region in regard to migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus are basically 
similar. They are expressed in a discreet neutrality (41-43% of respondents) that is combined with 
both hidden and explicit negativity and xenophobia. The proportion of those who think of the 
presence of newcomers in a positive manner (12%) is several times inferior to the number of those 
who have expressed their opposition to the migrants (39% against work migrants, 42% against 
permanent residence). More or less certain social exclusion of foreigners is a significant 
concurrence for a position of cautious neutrality and indicates a specific potential for tensions in 
the interaction between the local population and the migrants. 
The state of mass consciousness of Tatars in the republic is segmented, mosaic and even 
contradictory. There is a small percentage of those who perceive immigrants positively and focus 
on their social inclusion into the local or regional community, but the rest, and they prevail, have 
neutral or negative attitude in regard to foreigners from Central Asia, detachment and negativism 
are even slightly more common. 
On the one hand, among those who treat the migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus 
states in a confidently positive way (this position is shared by a minimum number of respondents 
– only 6% of surveyed), Tatars have the vast majority, there are nearly two times more Tatars than 
Russians who express a positive attitude. On the other hand, the proportion of Russians having a 
neutral position is higher than among Tatars (respectively 48% and 39% for work migrants, 43% 
and 38% for permanent residence). The proportion of those who estimate immigrants negatively 
among Tatars and Russians is approximately equal (39% Russians and 41% Tatars in regard to 
work immigrants, 42% and 43%, respectively – in relation to migrants intending to stay for a  
permanent residence). However, if the position of neutrality among ethnic Russians is 
predominant, more or less certain negativism prevails among Tatars.  
Sociological project examined also to which extent the local population is opened to 
relations with migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus at various distances of the social 
interaction: "far" distance (as new residents of Tatarstan and potential Russian co-nationals), 
"medium" (as co-workers and neighbors) and "close" (as a spouse and a member of the family). It 
is not surprising that the private sphere of family and kinship is the most closed to the 
representatives of outgroups. It is more noteworthy that the level of negativity for the ‘far’ social 
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roles is higher than for medium distance of interaction with newcomers: only 9% of Tatarstan 
population are ready to accept immigrants as fellow citizens and almost 47% (this is the dominant 
position) do not agree with such perspective, having also a significant proportion (37-38%) of 
respondents who remained neutral. A possible medium distance interaction – as with co-workers 
– is estimated more calmly, negative views in this case are more rare (40%). The position of Tatars 
and Russians onto this issue is strongly similar, therefore, a thesis of cultural and religious 
solidarity with foreign coreligionist is not seriously confirmed.  
4 DISCUSSION 
Another 5 - 7 years ago, the presence of migrants in Tatarstan did not cause any concern, 
and the relationship between locals and newcomers was estimated as prosperous. In addition, the 
situation in the regions of Russia attracted little attention because the main migration flow was 
focused on Moscow and St. Petersburg or border areas. The acuteness of the issue was linked 
directly to the number of migrants; it was not without reason assumed that the greater the migration 
burden on the territory, the higher is the possibility of conflicts with the local population. However, 
over time it became clear that the picture is much more complicated. In some regions even a small 
number of newcomers (not necessarily being foreigners) provoked social tensions (Grigoriev, 
2007). The authors of the nationwide survey of cross-border migration into the country regions 
saw in this a manifestation of psychology of an "aggressive vigilance" and of behavioral strategies 
that can be qualified as an "anticipatory vengeance" however in a culturally heterogeneous 
community of Tatarstan “there [was] already nothing to lose” in this sense." (Golunov, 2008; 287). 
Therefore, the first conflicts between migrants and residents of Tatarstan settlements – 
villages Shumkovo and Kurmanaevo – were a surprise. Events in Kurmanaevo questioned the 
thesis of cultural and religious affinity with people from Central Asia professing Islam. One of the 
main accusations addressed to migrants (it is notably often heard also in other conflict situations 
in the country, regardless of regional location), laid in the fact that the Tajiks who arrived in the 
village showed disrespect to the local people and local customs. 
The fact that conflicts did not happen in Kazan, the capital of the republic with a 
population of over 1 million people but in the countryside, did not fit into the above logic ("the 
more migrants, the more difficult is their adaptation and integration"). This situation also was 
contradictory to the image of Tatarstan as an "attractive region for resettlement and migrant labor" 
(Ismagilov, 2014). Support of Tajiks on behalf of Tatars in the face of the local Muslim clergy 
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contributed indeed to the their legal settlement in the village. Muslim solidarity was directly 
pointed out by the press as a motive for the actions of the local imams 
(Sulejmanov, 2013). However, most part of the local population – who are ethnic Tatars – 
demanded that the workers leave the village, accusing local officials and clergy of corruption. The 
media of the Republic widely covered the conflict in the Tatar village Kurmanaevo, with a total of 
just over 700 residents, with a few settled there Tajik families. Journalists noted: "although 
Tatarstan authorities kept for a while silence about this incident, they still perceived the conflicts 
in Shumkovo and Kurmanaevo as a wake-up call" (Electronic Newspaper of Republic of Tatarstan, 
2013). 
Mass survey data states that the percentage of those hostile to migrants in the countryside 
is nearly the same as in the metropolitan Kazan, where there is the highest concentration of 
newcomers. Consequently, even despite a small influx of migrants the countryside, notable for its 
relative cultural homogeneity, adherence to the settled way of life and a severe social and economic 
deprivation, becomes the environment the least disposed to the social inclusion of the "others". It 
is nutrient for xenophobia not only to foreigners, but generally to the representatives of the alien 
nationality. 
Migratory pressure on the Republic’s capital – the city of Kazan, where about 70% of 
work permits to migrants from abroad are registered – enhances the competition for an access to 
social benefits in terms of the more acutely perceived socio-economic inequality, widespread of 
an incomplete and shadow employment of the local population. On a wider scale, both in rural and 
urban areas, there is an unwillingness to accept transformation of social relations in the country 
with its new hierarchies, competition, balance of power, larger openness of the borders, human 
mobility and dynamism of social practices. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Interpretation of the obtained empirical data foresees its evaluation from the prospective of a 
post-secular society (Habermas, 2006). The religious situation in the region is characterized by a 
number of "paradoxes" and contradictions. The vast majority of Tatars consider themselves as 
believers, associate themselves with Islam, acting at the same time massively more as "non-
practicing ethnic Muslims" who attend mosques rarely or not at all, do not fast and do not carry 
out canonical prayers. Secular orienteers and benchmarks continue to have a broad support, the 
idea of approval of a state religion is rejected by the majority, although the federal and regional 
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authorities support the traditional churches in order to enhance their multifaceted impact on the 
society. The post-secular society increases the importance of an inter-religious dialogue, which is 
rather successfully carried out in the region. Under these conditions intra-religious differences and 
divergences of points of view became more vulnerable; intra-confessional conflicts are often 
projected into the relations of the local population with the migrants. 
Since 2012, when a resonant attempt at Mufti of the Republic of Tatarstan was committed 
in Kazan, the counteraction to the religious extremism and Wahhabism as well as support of typical 
for the republic traditional Islam have become important components of the domestic and 
migration policy of Russia and Tatarstan. Mass media reports on the involvement of migrants in 
the spread of radical ideas contributed to the anti-migrant attitudes and became an integral part of 
a restrictive immigration discourse that emerged in the country; it largely undermines the cultural 
and religious solidarity with fellow believers from neighboring countries. 
Therefore, the expectations of migrants arriving in Kazan and Tatarstan as in a "Muslim 
region" where they can count on the solidarity on the part of Tatar population are not always 
justified. On the one hand, the Republic of Tatarstan appears to be a more comfortable for Muslims 
and migrant workers area than many others, and the relationship between the locals and newcomers 
are evaluated as "calm". Besides the regional ethno-cultural policy is aimed at the strengthening 
of tolerance and favorable climate of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. On the other 
hand, mass concerns, socio-psychological dissatisfaction and vigilance of the population in face 
of the current socio-economic reforms and socio-cultural transformations become foundation for 
the hidden and explicit negativity towards migrants and diverse manifestations of xenophobia. 
They are aggravated by the social class polarization, the reduction of social obligations of the state, 
the intensified competition for access to social benefits. Increasing openness and changeability of 
the society on a global scale, multiplication of various social risks and uncertainty – all these 
diverse factors contribute to actualization of mass ethnic, racial and religious prejudices and 
phobias in the regional as well as in the national arenas. 
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